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EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MANDATORY
ARREST FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA
JOEL GARNER
Research Director of the Joint Centers for Justice Studies
The Commonwealth of Virginia has adopted a series of new
provisions, scheduled to become effective, July 1, 1997. These
provisions will provide directives for the criminal legal system in
response to the issue of domestic violence. One of these
provisions, the mandatory arrest of the "primary physical
aggressor" in instances of assault and battery of a family or
household member, is a matter of some controversy in Virginia
and the nation. This article focuses on evaluating the
effectiveness of the mandatory arrest provision in Virginia. The
underlying premise of this article is that systematic evidence is
different from personal experience, and even professional
expertise, and that, in many situations, where systematic evidence
exists, it is to be preferred over personal experience and
professional expertise. This article suggests that the critical skills
and faculties necessary to assess effectiveness in a systematic
manner are lacking in the written records on the adoption of
mandatory arrest in Virginia. Furthermore, there appears to be
no commitment of resources on the part of the Commonwealth of
Virginia to collect the systematic evidence necessary to assess
whether its new reforms will, in fact, improve the safety of
women. This article reviews the origins of the mandatory
arrest provisions in Virginia, the logic and evidence presented in
its support, and the available scientific evidence about the
effectiveness of mandatory arrest as a means to prevent
additional harm to the victims of domestic violence. The history
of recent reforms in the criminal law relating to domestic violence
measure effectiveness in terms of protecting the victims of
domestic violence from subsequent harm. If, in fact, the safety of
the victims of domestic violence is the goal of the new legal
provisions in Virginia, the issues at hand are 1) the extent to
which mandatory arrest has accomplished that goal in other
jurisdictions and 2) how the citizens of Virginia will know if
mandatory arrest has been effective in Virginia.
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I. THE VIRGINIA COMMISSION ON FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION
The immediate origins of the mandatory arrest provisions in
Virginia appear in the recommendations of the Virginia
Commission on Family Violence Prevention.1  The Virginia
Legislature created this twenty-five member commission to,
among other things, "study family violence" and "determine the
services, resources and legislation needed to address, prevent and
treat family violence."2 In January 1996, the Commission adopted
a legislative agenda that included a provision requiring that law
enforcement officers in the Commonwealth of Virginia arrest and
charge the suspected abuser upon finding probable cause for
assault and battery among family members. 3 If two or more
parties in the same incident make complaints, the police are to
arrest "the primary physical aggressor" and may use their discre-
tion not to arrest the other party even if the officer has probable
cause to believe that they also committed assault and battery.
Based on a report of its Law Enforcement Subcommittee, the
Commission included four criteria for determining who is the
"primary physical aggressor": 1) prior complaints of domestic or
family violence; 2) relative severity of the injuries inflicted on
each person; 3) the likelihood of future injury to each person; and
4) whether one of the persons acted in self-defense.4
The report cites no source for the concept of "primary physical
aggressor" nor for the four criteria that determine who fits the
description. The Commission does not mention the experience
any other law enforcement agency has had using this concept or
these criteria. The Commission made a related recommendation:
all law enforcement officers in the Commonwealth of Virginia
1. COMMISSION ON FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA,
House Document No. 50., Commonwealth of Virginia, Richmond, (1996) [hereinafter
COMMISSION REPORT].
2. Id. at 3.
3. The adopted legislation provides law enforcement officers with the discretion not
to arrest if they complete a report that indicates the special circumstances that dictated
a course of action other than an arrest. Neither the legislation nor the Commission's
report, however, provides any direction to law enforcement officers as to what such special
circumstances might be nor as to how supervisors would review, if at all, the exercise of
such discretion.
4. See VIRGINIA COMMISSION ON FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION, REPORT OF THE LAW
ENFORCEMENT SUBCOMMrrrEE, September 29, 1995, cited at page 57-58 in Appendix F of
the COMMISSION REPORT [hereinafter LAw ENFORCEMENT SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT].
EFFECTIVENESS OF MANDATORY ARREST
should be mandated to receive eight hours training on the new
mandatory arrest provisions every year.5
The Subcommittee's report provides virtually no evidence on
why mandatory arrest might be useful to the Commonwealth of
Virginia nor on the effectiveness of mandatory arrest for domestic
violence in other jurisdictions. For instance, the Subcommittee's
report on mandatory arrest begins with a one paragraph,
highly-dramatic anecdote that describes a brutal domestic violence
incident for which the police did not make an arrest. The report
does not indicate where this incident happened, when it
happened, nor if it ever happened. The report simply asserts that
incidents "similar to this one" are "unacceptable. ' 6  This
unsubstantiated account of one incident is not evidence; neither
is it relevant, even if true. It is not even a good anecdote, as it
provides no details on the victim's safety after the police left.
The second paragraph of the Subcommittee's report states
that in 1994 thirty-nine domestic homicides occurred in Virginia
and that in 1992 twenty-eight percent of all female homicide
victims nationally were killed by their husbands, ex-husbands or
boyfriends. These statistics are not relevant to the issue of
mandatory arrest because the Subcommittee makes no connection
between domestic homicides and the arrest practices of the police
in Virginia or nationwide. It might have been instructive if the
Commission had determined whether domestic homicides were
lower or higher in jurisdictions that made more domestic violence
arrests, or where mandatory arrests policies had previously been
implemented. The Subcommittee's report does not describe the
current behavior of any law enforcement agency in the
Commomwealth of Virginia. The Subcommittee's report does not
mention whether the police in Virginia make arrests in a large or
small proportion of domestic violence cases or the extent to which
the new policy will increase the number of arrests for domestic
violence in Virginia. This serious omission provides no
information on those behaviors that the mandatory arrest
provisions are attempting to change.
The Subcommittee report does repeat an assertion by an
official from the San Diego County Sheriffs Office that domestic
homicides decreased by more than fifty percent in the four years
following the implementation of a mandatory arrest policy in the
city of San Diego. No details on this policy are provided, such as
5. See id. at 60.
6. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 54.
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the nature of the mandatory arrest policy, the date it was imple-
mented, the number of arrests prior to and after the policy was
adopted, or even the number of domestic homicides before and
after this policy took effect. The Subcommittee's report also does
not address the relevance of behavior in the city of San Diego,
with a population of 1,157,000, to that of Virginia, where the
largest city, Richmond, has a population of 230,000. Without any
supporting information, this account remains, at best, a personal
testimonial of one jurisdiction's experience with their local version
of a mandatory arrest policy. 7 Possibly, the Subcommittee cites
this account because it expects the rate of domestic homicides to
decrease in Virginia as well, because of the mandatory arrest
provisions; however, the report fails to state this proposition.
The Subcommittee's report recommends mandatory arrest and
compulsory continuing training for all police officers on how to
implement the new mandatory arrest policy. Just as it provides
no information on the origins of the "primary physical aggressor,"
the report does not identify the capacity of anyone in the Com-
monwealth of Virginia, nor in the nation, to teach police officers
how to accurately and reliably implement this innovative policy.
A more glaring omission is the lack of any mention of the costs
incurred by mandating arrests or by training every police officer
in Virginia for eight hours every year. Arrests cost local juris-
dictions money. Police officers who make arrests can be out of
service for one to four hours and are unavailable for other patrol
assignments during this time. The report makes no mention of
this possible increase in the burden to local police agencies or of
the costs to local tax payers. In this sense, the mandatory arrest
provision is a near classic case of an unfunded mandate that the
State government imposes upon local governments.
The Subcommittee Report makes two fimal assertions. First,
it asserts that "immediate arrest reduces the incidence of domestic
violence."8  Second, it maintains that a statewide "mandatory"
7. The individual providing this account was recently dismissed from the San Diego
Sheriff's Office for falsifying testimony in domestic violence cases. Reductions in domestic
homicides in San Diego are also attributed to the policies and practices of the City
Prosecutor. See MEREDITH HoFFoRD & SusAN J. DANSIE, STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE AND
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES: RENO, DOMESTIc VIOLENCE
UNIT: OFFICE OF THE SAN DIEGO CITY ATTORNEY, (1992). This report, however, does not
provide the actual number of homicides or the dates on which the new prosecution policies
were initiated.
8. LAW ENFORCEMENT SUBCOMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 4 at 55.
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arrest policy is to be preferred over a "pro-arrest" policy.9 These
are important assertions that warrant detailed review.
II. SYSTEMATIC EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ARREST
The Subcommittee Report cites only one law review article
published in 1988 on the effectiveness of arrest.10 In no field of
behavioral research projects will one study, or even one review of
existing studies, ever be sufficient to provide a sound basis for
public policy. In addition, the reliability of this one article is
dubious, primarily because in 1995, seven years after the article
was published, the amount of systematic research on the
effectiveness of arrest for domestic violence increased
dramatically.1 2  As a result, the general understanding of the
most effective police response to domestic violence has changed
dramatically.
Prior to 1983, alternative police policies were essentially
evaluated in terms of the safety of police officers, not the safety
of victims. 3 Conventional wisdom held that there was very little
the police could do about domestic violence and that domestic
violence calls were the type of work most likely to result in the
death of police officers.' 4 This was not just the view of the police
profession. The position of the American Bar Association was
that the police should, "engage in the resolution of conflict such
as that which occurs between husband and wife . . .without
reliance upon criminal assault or disorderly conduct statutes." 5
9. Id. at 57.
10. See Sarah M. Buel, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence, 11 HARv. WOMEN'S
L.J., 213 (1988).
11. For instance, when requested to assess the evidence on the effectiveness of
rehabilitation, the National Academy of Sciences did not rely on existing studies or even
on a widely-acclaimed, comprehensive review of thousands of existing studies. See,
DOUGLAS IrON ET AL., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF
TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975). Rather, the National Academy of Sciences
commissioned an independent analysis of the samples from that review. See, STEPHEN
FEINBERG AND PATRICIA GRAMBSCH, An Assessment of the Accuracy of the Effectiveness of
Correctional Treatment, in THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS: PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS 119-47 (Lee Seechrest et al. ed., 1980).
12. See infra notes 29-33.
13. See MURRAY A. STRAUS ET AL.,. BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN
FAMILY (1980). New analyses of officer injury and death information no longer supports
this belief. See Joel Garner & Elizabeth Clemmer, Danger to the Police: A New Look
in NIJ RESEARCH IN BRIEF (1986).
14. See INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, TRAINING KEY 246:
INVESTIGATION OF WIFE BEATING (Gaithersburg, Md.: IACP, 1976).
15. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROJECT FOR STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION, 1981.
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To the extent that victim safety was a concern, police officers
were given conflicting advice on the best way to respond to
domestic violence incidents. Superiors advised them to 1) arrest
suspects; 2) separate the parties; or 3) counsel the couple and
leave. 16 On the basis of some highly dramatic anecdotal evidence,
officers were warned that arresting the suspect might result in
the offender returning to the home and inflicting more harm on
the victim. 7 At that time, there was no systematic evidence
about what happened to victims after the police left.
This perspective changed dramatically in 1983 when the
results of the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment were
released.18  In that experiment, street-level police officers'
selections of the most appropriate response to misdemeanor
domestic violence were determined by an experimental design of
random assignment to one of three treatments: 1) arresting the
suspect; 2) ordering one of the parties out of the residence; and
3) advising the couple. Using victim interviews and official
records of subsequent police contact, this study reported that the
prevalence of subsequent offending - assault, attempted assault,
threats of assault and property damage - was reduced by nearly
fifty percent when the police arrested the suspect.19
The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment was a critical
event in changing public and scholarly perceptions of domestic
violence from a "family problem" that was most amenable to
mediation and other informal, nonlegal interventions, to a
violation of the law requiring a formal criminal justice sanction.2°
The results of the experiment were given widespread publicity in
over 300 newspapers and on the evening news broadcasts of the
three major networks.21 In addition, in 1984 the U.S. Attorney
General's Task Force on Family Violence endorsed the findings of
the study and recommended that state and local agencies adopt
16. See James Q. Wilson, Forward, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE POLCE, STUDIES
IN DETROIT AND KANSAS CITY iii-vi (1977).
17. Parnas, supra note 15, at 914-60.
18. See Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of
Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. Soc. REv. 261 (1984); Phillip M. Boffey, Domestic
Violence: Study Favors Arrest, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 5, 1983.
19. See infra note 20.
20. Joel H. Garner & Jeffrey Fagan, Victims of Domestic Violence, in VICTIMS OF CRIME,
45, 53-85 (edited by Robert Davis & Wesley Skogan eds., 1997).
21. Lawrence W. Sherman & Ellen G. Cohn, The Impact of Research on Legal Policy;
the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiments, 17 L. & Soc'y REv. 101, 117-44 (1989).
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a pro-arrest policy toward domestic violence.2 Prior to 1981,
fourteen states, including Virginia, did not even authorize law
enforcement officers to make an arrest for misdemeanor assault,
unless that assault occurred in the presence of the officer.23 This
was true of misdemeanor assaults between strangers, as well as
misdemeanor assaults by one family member on another.
Known limitations of the project's design and implementation
tempered the enthusiasm for the deterrent effects of the legal
sanctions reported in the Minneapolis experiment. That is, the
experiment included only 330 cases with 114 arrests and the
jurisdiction surveyed was not a particularly representative one.
Other scientists balanced their praise of this study with criticisms of
the overreach of its conclusions and concerns about the widespread
publicity prior to substantiation of these results through secondary
analysis and replication in other jurisdictions2 Even the original
authors 2l and the Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence
called for replications of this study in other jurisdictions. 2
Between 1985 and 1990, police departments in five other
jurisdictions - Charlotte, North Carolina; Colorado Springs,
Colorado; Dade County, Florida; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; and
Omaha, Nebraska - implemented clinical trials on the
effectiveness of alternative police responses to domestic violence.
Beginning in 1990, the results of these studies were published in
scientific journals.2
22. U.S. Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence, FINAL REPORT, ATTORNEY
GENERAL's TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
(1984).
23. See NANCY LOVING, POLICE EXEcUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, RESPONDING TO SPOUSE
ABUSE AND WIFE BEATING: A GUIDE FOR POLICE: WASHINGTON, D. C. (1980); Lisa Lerman &
Franci Livingston, State Legislation on Domestic Violence, 6 RESPONSE 4 (1983).
24. See Arnold Binder & James W. Meeker, Experiments as Reforms, 16 J. CRIM. JUST.
347 (1988); Richard Lempert, Humility is a Virtue: On the Publication of Policy Relevant
Research, 23 L. & Soc'Y REv. 45 (1985).
25. See Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, THE MINNEAPOLIS DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE EXPERIMENT, 13 Washington, D. C.: Police Foundation Reports (1984).
26. See U.S. Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence, FINAL REPORT,
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, 91, (1984).
27. See, e.g., Richard A. Berk et al., Bayesian Analysis of the Colorado Springs Spouse
Abuse Experiment, J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 170 (1992); Franklyn W. Dunford,
System-Initiated Warrants for Suspects of Misdemeanor Domestic Assault: A Pilot Study,
7 JUST. Q. 631 (1990); Franklyn W. Dunford et al., The Role of Arrest in Domestic Assault:
The Omaha Police Experiment, CRIMINOLOGY 183 (1990); J. David Hirschel et al., The
Failure of Arrest to Deter Spouse Abuse, 29 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQUENCY 7 (1992);
Anthony Pate & Edwin E. Hamilton, Formal and Informal Deterrents to Domestic Violence.
The Dade County Spouse Assault Ekperiment, 57 AM. SOC. REv. 691 (1992); Lawrence W.
Sherman et al., The Variable Effects of Arrest on Crime Control: The Milwaukee Domestic
Violence Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137 (1992).
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These studies produced seemingly inconsistent results. The
deterrent effect of arrest varied depending on whether success
was measured by official records or victim interviews; whether
only offenses against the same victim or all victims were counted;
and depended on whether only violent crimes or all crimes were
considered. 21 None of these new studies used threats of violence
as a measure of recidivism; whereas, in the original Minneapolis
experiment threats of violence with no actual physical violence
constituted about half of all the reported failures.29 In some
jurisdictions arrest was associated with reduced victim harm for
some measures; but, in other jurisdictions victims suffered no less
subsequent harm when the police did not make an arrest
compared to when they did. In one jurisdiction, Milwaukee, in
terms of one measure of harm - the number of repeat offenses of
any kind against the same victim - arrest was associated with
more subsequent harm to victims of domestic violence.30
These studies have resulted in a major re-evaluation of the
effectiveness of arrest as a mechanism to protect victims of
domestic violence. While some uncertainty remains, it is clear
that the reductions of fifty percent reported in the original
Minneapolis study have not been substantiated in any of the
replications. In addition, effectiveness varies based on how
subsequent harm to the victims is defined and measured. The
current evidence is that, at best, arrest has a marginally positive
effect in some jurisdictions; at worst, arrest could make some
offenders more violent.
One explanation for the inconsistencies in the available
evidence from the different research sites is the fact that the
widely diverse jurisdictions surveyed included varying proportions
of married and employed offenders. Secondary analyses of the
data from four of the five replications indicate that arrest is
effective for married and employed suspects, but that arrest
results in increased violence among unmarried and unemployed
28. See Joel Garner et al., Published Findings from the Spouse Assault Replication
Program: A Critical Review, 11 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1995).
29. See Patrick R. Gartin, Dealing with Design Failures in Randomized Field
Experiments: Analytic Issues Regarding the Evaluation of Treatment Effects, 32 J. REs.
IN CRIME & DELNQUENCY 425 (1995).
30. See Sherman et al., supra note 27, at 137.
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suspects. 31 These analyses are imperfect and subject to further
testing; however, they constitute the most comprehensive and
detailed assessment of the effectiveness of arrest available in
1997.
These findings have important implications for Virginia, or
any other jurisdiction considering adopting state-wide policies for
policing domestic violence. The primary implication is that the
disparate findings from Minneapolis and the replication studies
stem from the different mix of suspects included in the studies.
If this hypothesis is true, then arrest will have generally negative
effects in jurisdictions like Richmond, with relatively high
unemployment and a high proportion of unmarried, intimate
partners; and generally positive effects in Virginia jurisdictions
with higher percentages of employed and married suspects.
Under such circumstances, requiring a uniform state policy of
mandatory arrest, which is not attentive to variations in local
conditions, may endanger more victims than it protects.
III. EVIDENCE ON "MANDATORY" ARREST
No systematic empirical evidence exists about the
effectiveness of mandatory arrest policies. This makes the first
concern of this paper - assessing the extent to which mandatory
arrest has reduced domestic violence in other jurisdictions - quite
easy to answer. No evidence establishes that mandatory arrest
has ever worked anywhere. The lack of systematic evidence
about mandatory arrest is not to say that it does not protect
victims in any circumstances, nor that it will not protect victims
in Virginia. It is merely an assertion that, at present, the
systematic evidence does not yet support the belief that
mandatory arrest will protect the victims of domestic violence.
While the Subcommittee does not provide evidence, it does
provide a iationale for favoring a mandatory arrest policy over a
policy that encourages, but does not mandate arrest. The
Subcommittee contends that police officers should not be expected
to make the decision to make an arrest. The basis for
Subcommittee's assertion is that:
31. See Pate & Hamilton, supra note 27, at 691. Richard A. Berk et al., The Deterrent
Effect of Arrest in Incidents of Domestic Violence: A Bayesian Analysis of Four ield
Eperiments, 83 J. CRIM. L. 170 (1992); Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Crime, Pkmishment,
and Stake in Conformity: Legal and Informal Control of Domestic Violence, 57 AM. Soc.
Rv. 680 (1992).
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A pro-arrest policy unfairly places the arresting officer in the
position of a mediator. A police officer's job is to preserve
public order and prevent crime. By placing the burden on
the police to decide whether to make the arrest in a domestic
violence case, the law asks the officer to serve as a counselor,
which he is not trained to do and is beyond the requirements
of his position. It is unfair to the police officer for him to be
required to do more than preserve public order and prevent
crime.m
Thus, according to this Subcommittee report, police officers in
Virginia are capable, or after training will be capable, of
determining who is the primary physical aggressor, but incapable
of deciding whether or not to make an arrest.
Police officers make discretionary decisions about whom to
arrest in a large variety of situations and the best empirical
evidence indicates that officers do this quite well. The primary
determinants affecting an officer's decision to arrest are the
seriousness of the offense, the extent of injury to the victims, and
victim's preference for arrest. Extra-legal factors such as race,
sex, and class play only a minor role, or no role at all, in officer
decisions.
The movement to mandate arrest in domestic violence cases
is based upon what one author refers to as "the myth of full
enforcement."3 3 Many studies have documented that in cases
when probable cause to make an arrest exists, the police choose
not to make arrests in domestic violence incidents. Most of these
studies have asserted that the police treat female victims
differently than male victims, or that they treat the victims of
domestic violence differently than victims of stranger violence.
These conclusions hinge on an assumption that the police make
arrests in all or most incidents of violence with male victims, or
among strangers. This is not the case. Systematic field
observations of police in Washington, D.C.; Boston, Massachusetts;
and Chicago, Illinois during 196634 and in St. Louis, Missouri; St.
Petersburg, Florida; and Indianapolis, Indiana5 during 1977
established that the police do not make arrests in a majority of
32. LAW ENFORCEMENT SUBCOMMITEE REPORT, supra note 4 at 57.
33. Lawrence W. Sherman, POLICING DOMEsTIc VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS AND DILEMMAs
36 (1992).
34. DONALD BLACK, THE MANNERS AND CUsToMS OF THE POLICE (1980).
35. See Douglas A. Smith & Christy A. Visher, Street Level Justice: Situational
Determinants of Police Arrest Decisions, 29 Soc. PROBLEMS 167 (1981).
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incidents of violence, whether these incidents are misdemeanors
or felonies, have male or female victims, or are between strangers
or acquaintances. Furthermore, in most instances of violence, the
suspect has left before the police arrive; that is, there is no one
to arrest. While there are well-documented accounts of grievous
errors by police officers,3 the systematic evidence produced by
independent observation of police behavior reveals that the
relationship of the suspect to the victim plays no role in arrest
decisions.37
IV. OBSERVATIONAL STUDY OF THE POLICE IN RICHMOND,
VIRGINIA, 1990-1991
The Commission's report provides no information on the
frequency with which police officers in Virginia, or any other
jurisdiction, encounter instances of assault and battery, already
make arrests in those circumstances, or face domestic violence
incidents when neither of these conditions are met. This type of
information is available, however, at least for the city of
Richmond. During 1992, independent field observers rode with
officers of the Richmond Police Department on all three shifts for
over 1200 patrols and systematically recorded what they observed
in 1630 police-citizen encounters.3 While the published findings
from this research have not yet focused on the issue of domestic
violence, this study provides a rare opportunity to examine those
arrest practices of the Richmond police that the Commission and
the legislature have decided to change.
The Subcommittee's assertion about the capability of police
officers to make judgments about arrest decisions seems
unsubstantiated in light of decades of research on police decision
making. Furthermore, the Subcommittee's assertion is also at
variance with contemporary approaches to community policing
adopted in Virginia and around the nation. These contemporary
practices call upon police managers and patrol officers to abandon
rigid authoritarian and hierarchical models of management and
to use their minds and their best professional judgment to solve
problems and to respond to the priorities of the communities they
police. Thus, neither the available evidence, nor the Subcommit-
36. See Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (1984).
37. See Douglas A. Smith, Police Response to Interpersonal Violence: Defiming the
Parameters of Legal Control, 65 Soc. FORCES 767 (1987).
38. Stephen A. Mastrofski et al., Compliance on Demand: The Public's Response to
Specific Police Requests, 33 J. REs. ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY 269 (1996).
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tee's logic, provide a solid basis for implementing a uniform state-
wide mandatory arrest policy for domestic violence in Virginia.
And where evidence exists, the Subcommittee has chosen *to
ignore it.
Mandatory Arrest for What Offenses
The legislation adopted in Virginia does not propose that the
police should arrest in all cases of domestic violence. Rather, the
legislation advocates arrest only in those instances when the
police have probable cause to believe an assault and a battery
have occurred between individuals of the same family, or when an
offender has violated a previously issued protection order.
Because this formulation has no apparent model in any other
state, it deserves particular attention.39  In addition, the
Commission and its Subcommittee provide no rationale for
limiting mandatory arrest to these circumstances. Why, for
instance, are not all domestic assaults included? Are police
officers in Virginia capable of making decisions for arrests in
domestic assaults, but not capable when those assaults include
battery? If mandatory arrest is a good approach to protecting the
victims of domestic violence, why is it not mandated for all
violence offenses? The reports of the Commission and its
Subcommittee include no justification.
V. EVALUATING MANDATORY ARREST
This critique of the logical and empirical bases of the
Commission's recommendations does not establish that the newly
adopted mandatory arrest policies will not improve the safety of
victims of domestic violence for the simple reason that the process
of adopting new policies need not have any impact on the
effectiveness of that policy. The critique does, however, establish
that it is not self-evident that the mandatory arrest provisions
will improve the safety of the victims of domestic violence in
Virginia. Actually, more doubt arises after a close analysis of the
empirical data supporting the Commission's choice of policy.
From this doubt the idea originates that the safety of domestic
violence victims might be improved if Virginia first knew more
39. See generally Domestic Violence: A History of Arrest Policies and a Survey of
Modem Laws, 28 FAM. L. Q. 509 (1994) (presents the great variety of State statues
authorizing arrest and the unique situations in which arrest is mandated in several
states).
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about the behavior of its police, as well as the behavior of the
victims and offenders of domestic violence.
VI. IMPEDIMENTS TO EVALUATION
Many factors serve as impediments to using systematic
evidence about the implementation of mandatory arrest in
Virginia in order to help protect the victims of domestic violence.
First, the policy makers in the Legislature and in the Commission
have not identified what the objectives of these provisions are,
nor when domestic violence victims can expect these
improvements to become evident. These are serious omissions.
The Commission and the Legislature are very detailed in
telling police agencies what to do; however, they fail to provide
any detail on the objectives of this action. It is unclear whether
the goal is to increase the number of arrests, or to reduce the
workload of the police; or whether to decrease the number of
victims of domestic violence, or reduce the extent of harm to the
individuals who are victimized. Specificity in articulating the
objectives is of vital importance because, as is apparent in the
published findings of the replication studies on the effectiveness
of arrests, different results can occur with different measures. An
evaluation requires not only specific objectives, but some notion
about when it is reasonable to expect that the measures will
produce results. For instance, if, as the Subcommittee's San
Diego anecdote might suggest, reductions in the number of
domestic homicides are one objective, it would be useful to
identify a time frame in which those reductions should occur; that
is, for example, in July 1997, the last six months of 1997, in
1998, or not until the year 2000. The final aspect of marking
objectives is to state by what margin those objectives should
change before the Commission considers the mandatory arrest
policies a success. The Commission does not indicate, for
example, whether they anticipate that the policy will completely
eliminate the number of domestic homicides, cut the number in
half, or limit the homicides to the current number.
VI. EVALUATION RESOURCES
Even if the Commission or the Legislature had provided
detailed objectives, there are additional hurdles to evaluating the
mandatory arrest provisions. The Legislature has mandated
numerous domestic violence reduction activities that will cost
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millions of dollars a year to implement, but has provided no
resources for evaluating the impact of those activities. The job of
the Legislature is to set priorities, and their budgeting evinces
that increasing knowledge about mandatory arrest in instances of
domestic violence is not one of those priorities.
Knowledge can be expensive. Each of the studies charting
the effectiveness of arrest cost the Federal government over
$500,000. This figure does not include the time and effort
expended by the implementing police agencies nor the subsidized
salaries received by the university-based researchers. 40 Research
on Virginia's mandatory arrest provisions, however, need not be
that expensive. Ignorance of the new law's effectiveness,
however, may have a high price tag for the victims of domestic
violence in Virginia.
VII. COMPETING ACTIVITIES
The simultaneous adoption of several, interrelated provisions
that have the same general objective of improving the safety of
the victims of domestic violence impedes the effectiveness of the
evaluation of the productiveness of mandatory arrest in Virginia.
Scientists prefer to vary one, or maybe two things at a time, and
hold everything else constant. This approach is thought to
maximize the generation of knowledge. Policy makers favor
implementing new policies as a bundle of activities, each
addressing the problem at hand in slightly different ways. This
practice is understood to achieve the greatest public good in the
form of the reduction of domestic violence. The success of some
of the provisions, however, such as the implementation of a new
automated information system about the processing of domestic
violence cases, can skew the perceived success of mandatory
arrest. A more comprehensive review of all the provisions
recommended by the Commission and adopted by the Legislature
is beyond the scope of this paper. Some of the provisions,
however, such as the implementation of new automated
information systems about the processing of domestic violence
cases, may have such large positive effects that they prevent
scientific methods from detecting the relatively modest impact of
mandatory arrest, if any.
40. Joel Garner et al., Published Findings from the Spouse Assault Replication
Program: A Critical Review, 11 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1995).
EFFECTIVENESS OF MANDATORY ARREST
This impediment to evaluation is not unique to questions
about the effectiveness of mandatory arrest, or to the other
provisions recommended by the Commission, or to the problem of
domestic violence. It is generic to public policy evaluation. 41
Thus, even if the Commission had specified detailed objectives for
mandatory arrest and the Legislature had provided sufficient
resources for an evaluation, the adoption and implementation of
multiple programs at the same time constrains the ability of
social science to provide definitive or even useful information.
The Need for Theory
The lack of theory presents another major impediment to the
evaluation of mandatory arrest in Virginia. Social scientists
designed the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment as a test
of deterrence theory.42 The central criminological interest in that
experiment was whether a criminal sanction of arrest would by
itself deter persons from engaging in similar behavior, that is,
violence against the same victim, for a period of six months. The
replications were designed with a similar theory testing goal in
mind.43
In those studies, and in any evaluation of mandatory arrest
in Virginia, a well-developed theory helps scientists and policy
makers interpret the findings of the study. Evaluation findings
typically are stated in terms of whether subsequent criminal
behavior increased, decreased or stayed the same following the
adoption of a new law. More often than not, evaluations of
criminal law reforms find no changes in behavior following
changes in the criminal law."
With a well-developed theory, an evaluation can provide
insight into why a particular law succeeded or failed to change
criminal behavior or the safety of victims. This understanding of
why laws are effective or ineffective can inform the nature of
future laws.45  The Virginia Commission provides no detailed
41. See EARL BABBlE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH (6th ed. 1992).
42. LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, THE SPECIFIC DETERRENT EFFECTS OF ARREST ON SPOUSE
ASSAULT (Nov. 1980) (proposal submitted to the Crime Control Theory program of the
National Institute of Justice).
43. See generally, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, ALTERNATIVE POLICE RESPONSES TO
SPOUSE ASSAULT: REPLICATING AN EXPERIMENT IN SPECIFIC DETERRENCE (1986).
44. See, e.g., JULIE HORNEY & CASSIA SPOHN, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE
IMPACT OF RAPE REFORM LEGISLATION (1989).
45. See Jeffrey Fagan, Keynote Address of the National Evaluation Conference,
Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice (1995).
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account of the mechanisms by which a statewide mandatory
arrest policy will affect police behavior, victim behavior, or
suspect behavior. Unless the Commission articulates such a
theory, an evaluation of mandatory arrest cannot address why the
law did or did not protect the victims of domestic violence.
Scientific Commitment
In general, the failure of commissions and legislatures to
involve the scientific research community constitutes a significant
impediment to the evaluation of mandatory arrest. Well-specified
objectives, the commitment of sufficient resources, the evaluation
of the several reforms as a package, and the development of
theory about mandatory arrest are, in themselves, insufficient to
produce a rigorous assessment of the costs and the benefits of
mandatory arrest. An evaluation requires the professional
expertise of well-trained scientists. Virginia is not without such
individuals and their talents could be utilized to assess
mandatory arrest. As of yet, however, this has not happened.
Two factors may account for this fact. First, the research
community in Virginia, like the nation, is rewarded primarily for
publishing in scientific journals. Improving public policy is not
a traditional goal of university-based researchers.46 Few, if any,
academics get promotion or tenure for such practical contribu-
tions.
The second factor preventing the scientific evaluation of the
effects of mandatory arrest in Virginia is the lack of appreciation
for research on the part of state policy makers. The work of the
Commission and the Legislature reveals no expectation that their
work might be improved if knowledge from social research were
brought to bear. Ironically, this was not the attitude nor the
experience of law enforcement officials in Minneapolis, Charlotte,
Dade County, Colorado Springs, Milwaukee, and Omaha who
worked closely with researchers to design and implement the
studies on the effectiveness of arrest for domestic violence. The
police in Richmond have demonstrated a willingness to subject all
of their patrol activities to independent evaluation and that
willingness might extend to examining the new mandatory arrest
provisions.
46. See Charles F. Wellford, Controling Crime and Achieving Justice, 35 CRIMINOLOGY
1 (1997).
EFFECTIVENESS OF MANDATORY ARREST
Taken together, these impediments are formidable and the
prospects for any systematic evaluation of mandatory arrest in
Virginia appear slim. The only silver lining is that the
Commission and the Legislature have imposed no restrictions on
law enforcement agencies in Virginia that would preclude them
from conducting their own evaluations independently or in
conjunction with other agencies. If an evaluation of mandatory
arrest for domestic violence in Virginia were ever to be properly
conducted, the local law enforcement agencies responsible for.
implementing mandatory arrest must actively participate in the
project. As was done in Minneapolis and other jurisdictions,
Virginia law enforcement agencies, in collaboration with local
researchers, could design and implement their own evaluations.
They need not wait upon State officials for approval or direction.
Law enforcement agencies in Virginia would be responsible for
implementing a variety of procedures and regulations to
complement the state-wide mandatory arrest policies. After all,
they, not the Legislature nor the Commission, would be the
primary users of the information about the impact of those
policies, procedures, and regulations on the safety of the victims
of domestic violence.
To evaluate mandatory arrest, law enforcement agencies
would need to identify what they think the primary objectives
are, mobilize the necessary financial resources, focus on which
aspects of the new law will be evaluated, articulate a theory of
how the law's provisions would work if effective, and recruit the
necessary scientific talent. The need for information and the
willingness to examine current practices critically and objectively
have become the hallmark of police professionalism and may be
the necessary elements to overcome the existing impediments to
evaluating the effectiveness of mandatory arrest in Virginia.
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